\u3cem\u3eRoper\u3c/em\u3e’s Unfinished Business: A New Approach to Young Offender Death Penalty Eligibility by Austin, Nichole M.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 69 Number 4 Article 5 
10-5-2021 
Roper’s Unfinished Business: A New Approach to Young Offender 
Death Penalty Eligibility 
Nichole M. Austin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nichole M. Austin, Roper’s Unfinished Business: A New Approach to Young Offender Death Penalty 
Eligibility, 69 Buff. L. Rev. 1195 (2021). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol69/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 
1195 
Buffalo Law Review 
VOLUME 69 AUGUST 2021 NUMBER 4 
Roper’s Unfinished Business: 
A New Approach to 
Young Offender Death Penalty Eligibility 
NICHOLE M. AUSTIN† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The early 2000s witnessed an important sea change in 
American death penalty jurisprudence. First, the Supreme 
Court’s momentous 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia 
categorically exempted the intellectually disabled from the 
death penalty.1 Central to the Court’s reasoning was the 
proposition that societal standards of decency put the 
practice of executing such individuals within the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments” 
prohibition.2 In Atkins, the Court did not initially prescribe 
a method for determining the presence of intellectual 
disability, leaving the states to carry out the Court’s ruling.3 
Informed by the Court’s analysis of intellectual disability, 
the states have relied on IQ testing and professional 
 
†JD class of 2021, University at Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to 
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well as the Buffalo Law Review members for their diligent and excellent work in 
the editing process. 
 1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–321 (2002). 
 2. See id. at 316. 
 3. Id. at 317. 
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evaluation of offenders’ adaptive behaviors to determine who 
may fall into the intellectual disability exemption. Later 
Supreme Court guidance has made this methodology a 
requirement. 
Three years after Atkins, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Roper v. Simmons created another categorical exemption 
in the form of a “bright-line” rule prohibiting the execution 
of offenders convicted of capital crimes committed before the 
age of 18. As in Atkins, the Court found that national 
evolving standards of decency regarded the practice of 
executing juvenile offenders as a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. In the 
Court’s words, “[Eighteen years old] is the point where 
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood 
and adulthood and [is] the age at which the line for death 
eligibility ought to rest.”4 
Sixteen years later, a new evolving standards of decency 
argument is emerging in support of raising the death 
eligibility age to twenty-one due to greater scientific 
understanding of the lingering developmental immaturity 
among such individuals. While well intentioned, this 
argument misses the mark. As this Comment will illustrate, 
duplicating Roper’s bright-line rule approach for older 
offenders is antithetical to demands that the death penalty 
be reserved for the most culpable offenders. This is because 
the criterion for inclusion in the Roper exemption is mere 
age, which excludes assessment of offenders on the basis of 
attributes and mental culpability. For this reason, the Roper 
bright-line rule suffers from arbitrary application.5 Simply 
expanding the Roper exemption will only replicate this 
problem. Rather, any new exemption for young adult 
offenders should be made consistent with Atkins and its 
progeny, which require an attribute-driven assessment of 
death eligibility grounded on clinical tools for diagnosing 
 
 4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005). 
 5. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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intellectual disability. The Atkins approach, much more so 
than Roper, emphasizes individual characteristics and the 
capacity for mental culpability, and presents a superior 
model for death penalty exemption. 
Though adopting an Atkins-like approach for young 
offenders would require the rejection of age-defined bright-
line rules, this Comment will further demonstrate that the 
current state of neuroscience and clinical psychology 
suggests that the idea may be much more feasible than is 
commonly presumed. It is important to emphasize that this 
Comment does not seek to present a complete framework for 
a new young offender exemption. Instead, the objective of the 
present inquiry is to challenge the assumption that the 
Atkins approach is impossible to apply to young offenders 
and to demonstrate its viability. In the process, this 
Comment provides some insight into what an attribute-
driven assessment of young offenders might entail in the 
context of death penalty eligibility, including tools and 
methodologies already available from modern science. 
II. THE ROAD TO EXEMPTING JUVENILES 
FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
A. Evolving Standards 
The Fourteenth Amendment empowers the Supreme 
Court to review the states’ imposition of the death penalty 
and hold such punishment up to the rigors of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”6 In full, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause asserts, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”7 To date, the Court has declined to find that the 
death penalty is unconstitutional per se under the Eighth 
 
 6. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
1198 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
Amendment.8 However, the Court has deemed certain 
applications of the death penalty to be unconstitutional, such 
as its imposition in cases involving juveniles, the 
intellectually disabled, and non-homicide crimes.9 In the 
twentieth century, the Court has principally used as its 
guide an “evolving standards of decency” test in delimiting 
such cruel and unusual punishments.10 
Development of Eighth Amendment evolving standards 
of decency doctrine has roots in the 1910 case Weems v. 
United States.11 In Weems, the Court considered the meaning 
of cruel and unusual punishment in evaluating the 
constitutionality of a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment 
and “hard and painful labor” imposed on a US officer for the 
crime of falsifying government documents.12 The Court noted 
that the meaning of the term was not static “but may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane 
justice.”13 In the later case Trop v. Dulles, which involved the 
 
 8. For discussion, see John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The 
Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1916–
19 (2012). 
 9. See id. at 1918–19. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), prohibited 
imposition of the death penalty for non-homicide child rape, although the decision 
has been interpreted as applying to nonhomicide crimes generally. See Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (citing Kennedy, 551 U.S. at 437–38). 
 10. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) 
(plurality opinion)). As this Comment focuses on evolving standards of decency 
doctrine, earlier history of the constitutionality of the death penalty will not be 
explored. 
 11. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 12. Id. at 357. Additional features of the sentence included “a chain at the 
ankle and wrist of the offender, . . . no assistance from friend or relative, no 
marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even 
in the family council,” and post-imprisonment limitations in personal liberties. 
Id. at 366. The sentence was imposed by the Supreme Court of the Philippine 
Islands, which was a U.S. territory at the time. See generally Victoria Reyes, After 
More Than a Century, Did the Philippines Finally Break Free from the United 
States?, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020, 6:00 AM) https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/outlook/2020/02/21/after-more-than-century-did-philippines-finally-break-
free-united-states/. 
 13. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378. 
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constitutionality of stripping a military deserter of US 
nationality, the Court referred to the Eighth Amendment 
analysis of Weems, concluding that cruel and unusual 
punishment draws meaning from “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”14 
The Court in Furman v. Georgia, in a per curiam 
decision, ruled that the death penalty as applied in the cases 
at bar constituted cruel and unusual punishment.15 The 
decision was 5-4, with each of the nine Justices issuing their 
own opinion.16 Though the decision struck down existing US 
death penalty laws, the moratorium was short lived.17 Four 
years after Furman, the Court issued a contrary decision in 
Gregg v. Georgia18 (and in two companion cases, Jurek v. 
Texas19 and Proffitt v. Florida20). In Gregg, the Court ruled 
that Georgia’s death penalty statute, amended in the wake 
of Furman, was constitutional.21 Important to the Court’s 
reasoning was the legislative response to Furman, which 
appeared to militate against the standards of decency case 
for per se rejection of the death penalty.22 At the time of the 
decision, thirty-five states had enacted new death penalty 
 
 14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Bessler, supra note 8, at 1913. 
 18. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 19. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is not 
per se unconstitutional and upholding Texas sentencing procedures). 
 20. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that the death penalty is 
not per se unconstitutional and upholding Florida sentencing procedures). 
 21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162–63, 196–207 (“The basic concern of Furman 
centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously 
and arbitrarily. . . . The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus 
the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the 
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant. . . . No longer can a 
jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always 
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”). 
 22. Id. at 179–81. 
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statutes to address the concerns of the Furman Court.23 
Considering such facts, the Court reasoned, “[I]t is now 
evident that a large proportion of American society continues 
to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and 
necessary criminal sanction.”24  
The Gregg opinion is notable for presenting the evolving 
standards of decency analysis as a two-part test to be applied 
to death penalty cases. The two prongs of the Court’s 
evolving standards of decency analysis are: first, a search for 
“objective indicia” of national consensus on the 
appropriateness of imposition of the death penalty for 
particular crimes;25 and second, whether the death penalty 
serves the penological purposes of deterrence and 
retribution.26 The modern test for death penalty 
constitutionality still employs this two-prong test, and it has 
been central to later cases most relevant to this Comment, 
namely, Atkins v. Virginia, decided in 2002, and Roper v. 
Simmons, decided in 2005. Using the evolving standards of 
decency doctrine, Atkins and Roper established, respectively, 
categorical exemptions to the death penalty for the 
intellectually disabled27 and juvenile offenders. The 
following section explores these cases in more detail. 
  
 
 23. Id. (finding, for example, that new state statutes “specif[ied] the factors to 
be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital 
sentence . . .”). 
 24. Id. at 179. In notable contrast, that same year, the Court ruled in Woodson 
v. North Carolina that mandatory death sentences violated the Eighth 
Amendment, describing such sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid” 
and concluding that they were no longer accepted in modern American society. 
428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); see also Bessler, supra note 8, at 1914. 
 25. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
 26. Id. at 183. 
 27. Note that Supreme Court in Atkins used the term “mentally retarded” in 
its decision. This Comment employs the term “intellectual disability,” which is 
the preferred modern clinical terminology. See infra notes 37–39 and 
accompanying text. 
2021] ROPER’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 1201 
B. A Tale of Two Categorical Exemptions 
Of the categorical exemptions from the death penalty 
established by the Supreme Court, two cases, Atkins and 
Roper, are especially conceptually linked. Indeed, Atkins 
featured prominently in the Court’s reasoning in Roper, 
decided a mere three years after the Atkins decision. As 
Atkins dealt with intellectually disabled defendants and 
Roper dealt with juveniles, at issue in each case was the 
peculiar mental deficiencies of each category of individuals, 
making them less criminally culpable and rendering the 
death penalty inappropriate. 
However, the categorical approaches of Atkins and Roper 
differ significantly. In particular, while the Court in Atkins 
observed the importance of IQ tests in identifying 
intellectually disabled offenders, the justices did not insist on 
a bright-line rule establishing a maximum IQ cut-off point.28 
Rather, the Court acknowledged that intellectual disability 
involves not just “subaverage intellectual functioning” but 
also deficiencies in “adaptive skills,” including 
“communication, self-care, and self-direction.”29 Noting these 
parameters, the Court left the task of determining which 
offenders fall into the exemption up to the states.30 
In contrast, the Roper decision established a definitive 
bright-line rule, exempting from the death penalty offenders 
who committed their offenses before the age of eighteen. 
Under this rule, the inquiry into applicability of the 
exemption ends at identification of the offender’s birthdate 
at the date of the crime. Unlike the intellectually disabled, a 
court need not examine a juvenile offender’s mental 
 
 28. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (highlighting 
multifaceted definitions of “mental retardation” utilized by the medical 
community); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: 
Rationales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 
33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 212–14 (2003). 
 29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 30. Id. at 317. 
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attributes to determine eligibility for the exemption. A 
detailed exploration of these crucial cases follows. 
1. Atkins and Exempting the Intellectually Disabled 
The Court in Atkins offered three primary rationales for 
exempting the intellectually disabled from the death 
penalty.31 First, the Court recognized that a national 
consensus had developed against executing the intellectually 
disabled.32 This determination was not based on the sheer 
number of states that had the exemption, but rather on the 
rapid “procession” of states that established the exemption 
from 1988 to 2001.33 In this thirteen-year period, nineteen 
states and the federal government implemented the 
exemption.34 Even in those states without the prohibition, 
actual execution of the intellectually disabled was 
uncommon.35 
Second, the Court argued that the execution of the 
intellectually disabled failed to serve deterrent or retributive 
purposes, as required by Supreme Court death penalty 
jurisprudence.36 With regard to retribution, the Court noted 
that it has consistently required that the death penalty be 
reserved for the most serious crimes.37 As such, the Court 
has rejected the imposition of the death penalty when the 
offender did not exhibit depravity beyond that of the average 
 
 31. See generally Fagan, supra note 28. 
 32. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–16. 
 33. Id. at 313–15. The Court noted that the shift occurred in reaction to both 
the 1986 execution of Jerome Bowden, an intellectually disabled offender 
convicted of murder and the Court’s refusal to prohibit the execution of the 
intellectually disabled in the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh. For details of the 
case, abrogated by Atkins, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 316. 
 36. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 
319. 
 37. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
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murderer.38 The Atkins Court reasoned that if the culpability 
of the average murderer could not justify the death penalty, 
then the lesser culpability of an intellectually disabled 
offender certainly could not justify the death penalty. 
Furthermore, the Court rejected that executing the 
intellectually disabled could serve a deterrent purpose, 
because such individuals lack the capacity to evaluate the 
risk of the penalty before deciding to offend and would not 
likely be deterred by the penalty.39 In addition, the Atkins 
Court observed that the intellectually disabled face a 
heightened risk of wrongful execution.40 In particular, these 
individuals face an enhanced risk of false confessions, and 
they may also be less able to demonstrate mitigating factors 
that call for less severe punishment or assist their counsel in 
their defense.41 
The Court cited the definition of intellectual disability 
provided by the American Association of Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD)42 as well as the 
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) similar 
definition.43 The current definition of intellectual disability 
 
 38. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (holding that a death 
sentence for two murders committed under conditions of “extreme emotional 
trauma” where the victims died instantaneously was not justified). 
 39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (“The theory of deterrence in capital 
sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the 
punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. 
Yet it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these 
defendants less morally culpable—for example, the diminished ability to 
understand and process information, to learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they 
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a 
result, control their conduct based upon that information.”). 
 40. Id. at 321. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 308 n.3. The AAIDD was known at the time as the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) and, accordingly, provided a 
definition on “mental retardation” rather than “intellectual disability.” See About 
Us, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://www.aaidd.org 
/about-aaidd (last visited Feb. 15, 2020). 
 43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. The APA definition used was also for “mental 
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involves limitations in intellectual functions, such as in 
learning, reasoning, and problem solving.44 An IQ test of 
seventy or as high as seventy-five generally indicates 
intellectual limitation.45 Adaptive behavior includes 
conceptual skills, such as language and literacy, number 
concepts, and self-direction; social skills, such as 
interpersonal skills and social responsibility; and practical 
skills, such as activities of daily living.46 In addition, another 
key hallmark of intellectual disability is that symptoms 
manifest before the age of twenty-two.47 
In order to conform to Atkins, the states have turned to 
clinical definitions of intellectual disability provided by the 
AAIDD, the APA, and the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.48 As a result, the states have typically 
implemented Atkins by identifying a three-prong test for 
intellectual disability. These prongs include: (1) significant 
subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) deficient adaptive 
behaviors; and (3) onset of such symptoms before the age of 
eighteen.49 The test has been set by state statutes or 
established by the courts themselves.50 Significant 
subaverage intellectual functioning is regarded as 
measurable intelligence falling approximately two standard 
 
retardation.” 
 44. Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability 
/definition (last visited Feb. 15, 2020). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 170 F. Supp. 3d 347, 352–53 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016). 
 49. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West 2021). 
 50. See James W. Ellis et. al., Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical 
Assessments in Atkins Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2018). As noted in 
Wilson, Cal. Penal Code § 1376 provides an example of a statutory definition of 
intellectual disability. 170 F. Supp. 3d at 352–53 (an example of court-developed 
doctrine). 
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deviations from the mean score of one hundred.51 Thus, an 
IQ score of approximately seventy to seventy-five or less 
indicates intellectual disability.52 The IQ tests likely to 
appear in court in Atkins cases are the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scales and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale.53 Short-form versions of IQ tests, which take 
considerably less administration time, may be used and 
submitted to courts, though reliance on such tests may be 
considered controversial.54 
2. Roper and Exempting Juvenile Offenders 
Three years after Atkins, the Court decided the issue of 
juvenile death eligibility in Roper v. Simmons. Prior to 
Roper, the Court had set aside a death sentence for a fifteen-
year-old offender in the plurality decision of Thompson v. 
Oklahoma.55 Four Justices in that case ruled that evolving 
standards of decency precluded executing offenders under 
the age of sixteen at the time of their crimes.56 However, 
Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, did not endorse this 
proposition, asserting that more evidence was needed, and 
the issue was left undecided.57 The following year, the 
majority of the Court denied that a national consensus 
regarded the execution of juvenile offenders58 as cruel and 
 
 51. Ellis et al., supra note 50, at 1327. 
 52. Id. at 1328. 
 53. Id. at 1347–49. 
 54. Id. at 1354–56. 
 55. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 56. Id. at 818–38. The four Justices were Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun. 
 57. Id. at 848–49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Although I believe that a 
national consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed 
before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion 
as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess.”). 
 58. Note that, prior to Roper, an offender who had committed a capital crime 
as a juvenile might not have been sentenced to death or actually executed until 
the offender surpassed the age of eighteen. This Comment uses the term “juvenile 
offender” to refer to those who committed their offenses before the age of eighteen 
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unusual punishment in Stanford v. Kentucky.59 
Though juvenile offender executions were not prohibited 
before Roper, youth could be considered as a mitigating 
factor in deciding whether death was justified in capital 
cases involving juvenile offenders. In Roper, the defendant’s 
youth was submitted to the jury as a mitigating factor to 
forestall the penalty of death.60 Nonetheless, the jury 
recommended the death sentence, which the court 
subsequently imposed on the defendant.61 In fact, the 
prosecution used the factor of youth as a reason to impose the 
death penalty, saying to the jury, “Think about age. 
Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? . . . Mitigating? Quite 
the contrary I submit.”62   
Simmons unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction 
relief on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel.63 
However, after the Atkins decision in 2002, Simmons again 
petitioned for relief on the grounds that Atkins prohibited 
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.64 The 
Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with this proposition and 
set aside the death sentence.65 The court specifically cited the 
development of a national consensus against executing 
juvenile offenders.66 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri high court’s 
 
without respect to whether the individual would have been sentenced to death or 
executed while still a juvenile. 
 59. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 60. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 953 (1997) (affirming Simmons’ conviction); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 
F.3d 1124, 1127, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001) (denying Simmons’ writ of 
habeas corpus). 
 64. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 400 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 399. 
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decision in Roper.67 With regard to the national consensus 
prong of the evolving standards of decency analysis, the 
Court observed that, even in the twenty states that did not 
prohibit juvenile execution at the time of the Court’s opinion, 
the practice was not common, and only three states had 
performed such executions in the decade preceding the 
decision.68 The rate of change in reducing or abolishing the 
practice was notably slower than the change that occurred 
between Penry and Atkins with respect to the intellectually 
disabled.69 However, as in Atkins, the Court was focused on 
the “consistency of the direction of change,” rather than raw 
numbers.70 Significant to the Court in Roper was the fact 
that since Stanford, no state that had prohibited the death 
penalty for juveniles had reinstated the penalty.71 That this 
occurred in an atmosphere of “general popularity of 
anticrime legislation” and signaled a trend toward “cracking 
down on juvenile crimes in other respects” was likewise 
notable.72 The Court also speculated that the slow rate of 
change between Stanford and Roper could be explained by 
the fact that twenty-seven death penalty states had already 
created juvenile exemptions by the time Stanford was 
decided.73 Furthermore, given that only two states had 
exempted the intellectually disabled by the time Penry was 
decided and Stanford and Penry were decided at the same 
time, the number of juvenile exemptions preceding Stanford 
suggested the prohibition had gained widespread support 
earlier than exempting the intellectually disabled.74 
As to the second prong of the analysis, the Court, citing 
 
 67. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561. 
 68. Id. at 564–65. 
 69. Id. at 565. 
 70. Id. at 566. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 566–67. 
 74. See id. 
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Atkins, noted that the death penalty must be reserved for 
offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most serious 
crimes” and whose “extreme culpability” makes them the 
“most deserving of execution.”75 Three features of juveniles 
suggested that they should not be classified with the worst 
offenders. These features included being more prone to 
engage in reckless behavior, being more susceptible to 
negative peer influence, and having more transitory 
personality traits.76 As juveniles are more vulnerable to 
immature, reckless behavior, the Court reasoned 
irresponsible juvenile conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult.77 Moreover, this behavior 
did not denote a moral character failing on par with that of 
an adult since juveniles do not yet have fully formed 
characters and are amenable to reform.78 
Due to the realities of juvenile psychology, the Court 
denied that the death penalty could be justified by deterrent 
or retributive considerations. Echoing the reasoning in 
Atkins, if the death penalty is not justified for the level of 
culpability for the “average murderer,” then it cannot be 
justified for the lesser culpability of a juvenile.79 As for 
deterrence, the Court stated that it was unclear whether 
juveniles could be deterred by the death penalty, but that 
their hallmark psychological features suggest that they are 
less likely to engage in the cost-benefit analysis that is at the 
heart of deterrence theory. Thus, since retribution and 
deterrence did not adequately justify the death penalty for 
juveniles, the punishment failed the second prong of the 
evolving standards of decency test. For these reasons, the 
Court established an unequivocal bright-line rule exempting 
 
 75. Id. at 568 (original quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 569–70. 
 77. Id. at 570. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 571; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); see also Godfrey 
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980). 
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from the death penalty those who had committed capital 
offenses before the age of eighteen.80 Stanford was, therefore, 
overturned.81 
The Court in Roper was quick to acknowledge that its 
bright-line rule was vulnerable to criticisms of 
arbitrariness.82 Giving short shrift to the concern, Justice 
Kennedy declared simply that “a line must be drawn” and 
noted the widespread societal acknowledgement that 
eighteen marks the line between childhood and adulthood.83 
The Court’s statement no doubt reflects pragmatic intuitions 
that exempting young offenders from the death penalty 
necessitates the imposition of such a line. Indeed, the Roper 
bright-line rule approach is attractive for practical reasons 
alluded to by Justice Kennedy. The rule provides a clear, 
definitive test for exempting a class of individuals whom 
society, in the main, believes ought to be exempted from the 
death penalty. In addition, the bright-line approach 
precludes the occurrence of controversial borderline cases by 
eliminating gray areas of application. The pragmatic appeal 
of the Roper rule also preempts worries over how to 
objectively evaluate juvenile mental characteristics that 
might otherwise serve as a basis for exemption. 
Nonetheless, the foregoing rationales do not allay the 
serious criticism that the Roper rule established an arbitrary 
exemption from the death penalty. The Court’s reasoning, 
after all, relied on the fact that juvenile brain development 
and mental characteristics make them less culpable for 
crimes. But under the Roper rule, offenders with presumably 
very few developmental differences84 are eligible for wildly 
 
 80. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have 
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. For example, an offender who is 17 years and 11 months old and an 
offender who is 18 years and 1 month old. 
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different punishments. This result is contrary to the 
proposition, articulated in Roper, that the death penalty 
ought to be reserved for the most culpable offenders and for 
the most serious crimes. 
The above considerations underscore the difficulty with 
proposals to cure the limitations of Roper by simply 
increasing the death penalty exemption age to twenty-one. 
In effect, advocates propose establishing another bright-line 
rule with an enlarged membership category. Though 
certainly this approach will exempt more individuals from 
the death penalty who ought to be exempt under the Roper 
rationale,85 identical problems of arbitrariness arise. That is, 
the rule would deny exemption notwithstanding the fact that 
an individual’s mental deficiencies and relative culpability 
may be identical to an individual who is eligible for the 
exemption due to age. The decision procedure would not be 
based on a coherent theory of culpability but a judicially 
imposed cut-off point and would be susceptible to the same 
inadequacies as the Roper decision itself. 
But is this result truly necessary to exempt young 
offenders from the death penalty? This Comment will argue 
the answer is “no.” An examination of Atkins and its 
implementation suggests that an alternative approach to 
young offenders is both possible and desirable. Although this 
Comment does not attempt to detail a specific model for such 
an approach, it instead demonstrates, as in Atkins cases, 
that a court can evaluate the mental attributes and relative 
culpability of young offenders in a way that is holistic, 
individualized, and without reliance on arbitrary cut-off 
points. To this end, the following section will set forth the 
grounds for the current evolving standards of decency 
argument for exempting young adults under twenty-one 
from the death penalty, followed by an examination of how 
Atkins has been applied in capital cases. This discussion will 
 
 85. I.e., on the basis that their mental deficiencies disqualify them from the 
death penalty. 
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serve as a basis for subsequent arguments that the approach 
to young offender death eligibility should emulate the Atkins 
approach and how it may be possible to do so. 
III. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY ARGUMENT FOR 
RAISING THE DEATH ELIGIBILITY AGE TO TWENTY-ONE 
A. Cultural Opinion 
Historically, subjecting those under the age of twenty-
one to the death penalty has not been widely supported in 
America. For example, according to Gallup, just 26% of 
Americans supported the death penalty for offenders under 
twenty-one in 1936 (when 59% overall favored the death 
penalty). In 1965, just 21% supported the death penalty for 
those under twenty-one (when 45% favored the death 
penalty overall).86 In 2018, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) adopted a resolution calling on death penalty 
jurisdictions to prohibit the execution of those who were 
twenty-one or younger at the time of their offense. The ABA 
cited the “growing medical consensus” that brain areas 
concerning decision-making and judgment continue to 
develop into the mid-twenties.87 As a result, “late 
adolescents,” or eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-olds, have 
“diminished capacity to understand the consequences of 
their actions and control their behavior” similar to those 
under eighteen.88 This fact, according to the ABA, is contrary 
to the Eighth Amendment’s demand that punishments be 
proportional and personalized to the offense and offender.89 
The death penalty, the most severe form of punishment, 
 
 86. Jeffrey M. Jones, The Death Penalty, GALLUP (Aug. 12, 2009), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/9913/death-penalty.aspx. 
 87. ABA House Delegates Recommendation 111, 1 (adopted Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/crsj/DPDPRP/2018_hod_
midyear_111.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. Id. at 11 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)). 
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should be reserved for the most culpable offenders who have 
committed the worst crimes in society.90 This cannot be true 
of late adolescent offenders because of their diminished 
rational capacities. 
The ABA also cited the changing landscape of the 
application of the death penalty.91 In particular, the ABA 
noted that fifty-two out of fifty-three jurisdictions had life 
without the possibility of parole options at the time the ABA 
resolution was passed.92 Furthermore, the use of the death 
penalty nationwide has declined.93 For example, the ABA 
observed that in 2016, only thirty-one individuals received 
the death penalty, and only two of those individuals were 
under twenty-one at the time of the offense.94 Indeed, the 
decline in the death penalty has only continued in 
subsequent years. Though undoubtedly impacted by 
disruptions in the justice system due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, in 2020 only seventeen people were executed in 
the US, and four were under twenty-one at the time of the 
offense.95 
Andrew Michaels has argued that the rarity of imposing 
the death penalty on offenders eighteen to twenty-one is 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. For comparison, the peak number of U.S. executions since the 1970s 
was ninety-eight in 1999. Tom Jackman & Mark Berman, Despite Recent Federal 
Flurry, Number of U.S. Executions Is Lowest Since 1991, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/12/16/us-
executions-decline/. 
 95. DEATH PENALTY INFO.  CTR., DEATH PENALTY IN 2020: YEAR END REPORT 10 
(2020), https://reports.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-end/YearEndReport2020.pdf 
[hereinafter 2020 YEAR END REPORT]. The Death Penalty Information Center 
attributes the particularly low number of executions in 2020 both to continued 
decline in public support for the death penalty and the COVID-19 pandemic, 
which delayed capital punishment proceedings. See id. at 10–12, 20. 
Notwithstanding the pandemic, both death sentences and executions have been 
on a precipitous decline since 1999. See id. at 9. 
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sufficient to satisfy the national consensus prong of the death 
penalty exemption test.96 In particular, Michaels argues that 
under Graham v. Florida,97 a national consensus against a 
practice can be found to exist, even if the practice is 
statutorily permitted in a majority of jurisdictions, when the 
punishment is rarely administered.98 Michaels argues that 
executing eighteen- to-twenty-one-year-olds is relatively 
infrequent, especially in light of the fact that this age group 
leads in violent crimes, including murder.99 This 
demonstrates “society’s reluctance to execute young adults 
despite their high offense rate . . . .”100 Furthermore, only a 
small number of states are responsible for the vast majority 
of executions of those in this age bracket, even though the 
punishment is available in a majority of jurisdictions.101 
Similarly, in Graham, the punishment rejected by the 
Court—life without parole for juvenile non-homicide 
offenders—was available in thirty-nine jurisdictions, but 
was imposed on very few juveniles, the majority of which 
were sentenced in just one state.102 
  
 
 96. Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteen- To Twenty-
Year-Olds from the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 150 
(2016). 
 97. 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (exempting juvenile non-homicide offenders from life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole). 
 98. Michaels, supra note 96, at 149–50 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 62–63 (2010)). 
 99. Id. at 170–71. 
 100. Id. at 171 n.197. 
 101. See id. at 169. 
 102. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64 (“[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
serving life without parole sentences. A significant majority of those, 77 in total, 
are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are imprisoned in just ten 
States—California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. Thus, only 11 jurisdictions nationwide 
in fact impose life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders—
and most of those do so quite rarely. . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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B. Judicial Opinions and Death Penalty Statistics 
A substantial challenge to the constitutionality of 
executing offenders under twenty-one recently emerged from 
the state of Kentucky. Defendants in the consolidated cases 
of Commonwealth v. Bredhold and Commonwealth v. Diaz 
successfully argued at the trial court level that such 
executions were unconstitutional. One of the defendants was 
Travis Bredhold, who was charged with murder and robbery 
(among other crimes) in the shooting death of a gas station 
employee, allegedly committed when Bredhold was eighteen 
years and five months old.103 Efrain Diaz, Jr., and Justin 
Smith were co-defendants charged with murder and robbery, 
allegedly committed when Diaz was twenty years and seven 
months old and Smith was eighteen and five months old.104 
Though not yet convicted, the commonwealth initially gave 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty in the cases.105 
Citing Roper, the defendants moved for exclusion of the 
penalty.106 In 2017, the Circuit Court of Kentucky, Seventh 
Division, agreed with the defendants, declaring the state’s 
death penalty statute to be unconstitutional due to the 
statute’s tolerance for permitting the death penalty for those 
under twenty-one at the time of offense.107 
The Kentucky cases provide an instructive look at 
precisely how a challenge to young offender executions could 
succeed. Especially important was the court’s reliance on 
science and neurobiological research to assess the 
appropriateness of the death penalty for under-twenty-one 
offenders. The court noted the “widely accepted” notion 
among neuroscientists that brain systems and structures 
 
 103. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Ky. 2020). 
 104. Id. at 412–13. 
 105. Id. at 413. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *6 (Ky. 
Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017). 
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which are key to “self-regulation” and “higher-order 
cognition” continue to develop into the mid-twenties.108 
Psychologically, these individuals are more likely to engage 
in “sensation-seeking,” to have poorer impulse control, to be 
less cognitively able to consider “risks and rewards of 
alternate course of action,” and are much more susceptible to 
peer pressure.109 The court reasoned that these psychological 
features are likely attributable to a “maturational 
imbalance” between the “socio-emotional system,” related to 
sensation and reward seeking, and the “cognitive control 
system,” which “catches up” during the mid-twenties.110 For 
example, studies have shown that the “peak age for risky 
decision-making” is between nineteen and twenty-one.111 
One study suggested that under stress, the brain of a twenty-
year-old functions similarly to a sixteen- to seventeen-year-
old.112 Bredhold, for his part, was determined to be 
approximately “four years behind his peer group in multiple 
capacities” and to have a number of mental disorders, such 
as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).113 Neuroplasticity 
also factored into the court’s analysis. Those in their late 
teens and early 20s have heightened plasticity, which 
suggests “strong potential for behavioral change.”114 Thus, 
adult criminality or antisocial behavior is difficult to predict 
 
 108. Id. at *4. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *5. 
 111. Id. at *4. 
 112. Id. at *5 (“Under emotionally neutral conditions, individuals between 
eighteen (18) and twenty-one (21) were able to control their impulses just as well 
as those in their mid-twenties (20s). However, under emotionally arousing 
conditions, eighteen– (18) to twenty-one– (21) year-olds demonstrated levels of 
impulsive behavior and patterns of brain activity comparable to those in their 
mid-teens. Put simply, under feelings of stress, anger, fear, threat, etc., the brain 
of a twenty- (20) year-old functions similarly to a sixteen- (16) or seventeen- (17) 
year-old.”). 
 113. Id. at *2. 
 114. Id. at *6. 
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from adolescence.115 Some research suggests that 90% of 
“serious juvenile offenders” discontinue criminal behavior in 
adulthood.116 
From the above observations, the court concluded that 
twenty-one-year-olds are “categorically less culpable” in the 
same ways the Supreme Court determined juveniles to be. 
Particularly, they lack impulse control and the ability to 
consider the consequences of their actions, and, therefore, 
knowledge of the prospective punishment of death does not 
have a deterrent effect.117 Moreover, their neuroplasticity 
means they have a “much better chance at rehabilitation” 
than adults.118 In the court’s words, “If the science in 2005 
mandated the ruling in Roper, the science in 2017 mandates 
this ruling.”119 
The court also evaluated “objective indicia of a national 
consensus” on the death penalty for offenders under twenty-
one. The court noted that of the states with death penalty 
statutes and no governor-imposed moratorium on 
executions, seven had de facto bans on executing offenders 
under twenty-one.120 Combined with the states without 
death penalty statutes and those with moratoria, thirty 
states would not execute an offender under the age of twenty-
one.121 Furthermore, only nine out of the thirty-one states 
with death penalty statutes had executed those under 
twenty-one at the time of offense between 2011 and 2016.122 
During this period, thirty-three such offenders were 
executed, with Texas accounting for nineteen of those 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at *4. 
 120. Id. at *2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *3. 
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executions.123 Excluding Texas as an outlier, the number of 
under twenty-one-year old offender executions dropped by 
50% between the period of 2001-2006 (with twenty-nine 
executions of under twenty-one-year old offenders) and the 
period of 2011-2016 (with fourteen executions of under 
twenty-one-year old offenders).124 Like the ABA, the 
Bredhold court also acknowledged the precipitous downward 
trend in the use of the death penalty overall.125 Between 1999 
and 2016, actual executions per year fell from ninety-eight to 
twenty, with only two individuals executed who had been 
under twenty-one at the time of their offenses.126 These facts 
provided sufficient indication of a national consensus 
opposed to the death penalty and especially for those under 
twenty-one.127 
However, following an interlocutory appeal by the 
commonwealth in 2020, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
ruled that the issue of constitutionality of the death penalty 
for those eighteen-to-twenty-one was not justiciable before 
the circuit court and was not property before the state 
supreme court at the time.128 As none of the defendants had 
yet to be convicted or sentenced, the injury at stake was 
merely hypothetical and, hence, none of the defendants had 
standing.129 The supreme court vacated the circuit court 
orders and remanded the cases, while not weighing in on the 
constitutional issue.130 Thus, the issue of constitutionality of 
executing under twenty-one-year-old offenders is unresolved 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. Specifically, the court observed that from 1999 to 2016, the number of 
death sentences imposed fell from 279 to 30. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Commonwealth v. Bredhold, 599 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Ky. 2020). 
 129. See id. at 416–18 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992)). 
 130. See id. at 423. 
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in Kentucky. 
At first blush, the Kentucky decisions are vulnerable to 
criticism that they are outlier cases that represent the 
opinion of one trial court jurisdiction.131 This criticism, 
however, overlooks judicial sentiment as expressed through 
actual sentences given to young adult offenders. As noted by 
the Kentucky circuit court, a look at national statistics shows 
executions and impositions of the death penalty on young 
adult offenders to be on the decline nationwide. A statistical 
examination of both the general use of the death penalty and 
the death penalty applied to young adult offenders give 
important insight into this trend. 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which 
significantly disrupted criminal justice proceedings 
nationally, including for capital cases, 2019 may present the 
most accurate picture of death penalty trends. In 2019, a 
total of twenty-two prisoners were executed and thirty-four 
new death sentences were imposed in the US.132 
Comparatively, in 1999, 279 death sentences were imposed 
and 98 executions were carried out.133 Application of the 
death penalty remained highly regionalized, with 91% of all 
executions occurring in the American South, and Texas 
accounted for 41% of executions overall.134 Of the eleven new 
death sentences imposed in 2019, seven were in Florida.135 
In contrast, no state in New England authorizes the death 
 
 131. In fact, on appeal, the prosecution in Diaz argued that no other 
jurisdiction recognized the unconstitutionality of sentencing eighteen- to twenty-
one-year-olds to death. See Justin Madden & Jim Warner, Victim of Gas Station 
Shooting Was a Family Man and a Man of Honor, Friend Says, LEXINGTON 
HERALD LEDGER (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.kentucky.com/news/local/crime 
/article44458410.html. 
 132. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 2019 YEAR END REPORT 1 (2019), 
https://reports.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-end/YearEndReport2019.pdf 
[hereinafter 2019 YEAR END REPORT]. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. at 3. 
 135. See id. at 10. 
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penalty.136 
In 2020, eighteen death sentences were imposed and 
seventeen executions were carried out.137 Though these 
figures are undoubtedly artificially low due to the pandemic, 
the Death Penalty Information Center asserted that the 
United States was “poised for its sixth consecutive year with 
fifty or fewer new death sentences and thirty or fewer 
executions” even before the impact of the pandemic.138 
Especially telling is the death penalty’s decline in both the 
eyes of public opinion and in state criminal justice systems. 
According to Gallup, in 2020, 55% of Americans favored the 
death penalty, a near fifty-year low.139 43% of Americans 
oppose the death penalty, which has not been as high since 
the 1960s.140 Per the latest statistics, Americans prefer life 
imprisonment to the death penalty 60% to 36%.141 
The retreat of the death penalty at the state level is also 
noteworthy. As of 2020, twenty-two states had abolished the 
death penalty.142 Even among states that do permit the 
death penalty, many have not carried out an execution in a 
decade or more. To date, thirty-four states have either 
abolished the death penalty or have had no executions in 
over ten years.143 Moreover, executions of young adult 
 
 136. See id. at 2. 
 137. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Support for Death Penalty Holds Above 
Majority Level, GALLUP (Nov. 19, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/325568/ 
support-death-penalty-holds-above-majority-level.aspx. Support for the death 
penalty peaked in 1994 at 80% and has been on a continuous decline since then. 
See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Colorado joined the ranks of non-death penalty states in 2020. 2020 YEAR 
END REPORT, supra note 95, at 4. The year before, New Hampshire became the 
twenty-first state to abolish executions. See 2019 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 
132, at 1. 
 143. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 4. 
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offenders are on a definitive decline. Between 2006 and 2011, 
the execution of young adults averaged approximately eleven 
per year.144 However only six such executions occurred in 
2012, five in 2013, and only three occurred in 2014 and 
2015.145 Of the twenty-two individuals executed in 2019, four 
were under the age of twenty-one at the time of their 
crimes.146 In 2020, four of the seventeen individuals executed 
were under twenty-one at the time of the offense.147 
C. Disparate Treatment of Young Adults in the Law 
It is a curious fact that in the United States today, the 
federal government considers a twenty-year-old to be too 
young to buy e-cigarettes but not too young to execute.148 
Indeed, the law is rife with examples of the disparate 
treatment of young adults due to their presumed 
immaturity. The federal minimum drinking age law is 
perhaps the most prominent example. The National 
Minimum Drinking Age Act, codified in 23 USC § 158, 
mandates the federal government to withhold 10% of 
highway funds from states that allow the purchase or 
possession of alcohol by those under twenty-one years of 
age.149 The motivation for the act was the belief by 
lawmakers that immature and irresponsible behavior of 
individuals under the age of twenty-one contributed to traffic 
fatalities. Relatedly, a majority of states have implemented 
dram shop and social host liability laws that impose liability 
on those who serve alcohol to those under twenty-one.150 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) is another important 
 
 144. Zoe Jordan, The Roper Extension: A California Perspective, 71 HASTINGS 
L.J. 197, 204–05 (2019). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See 2019 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 132, at 16. 
 147. See 2020 YEAR END REPORT, supra note 95, at 20. 
 148. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 149. See 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(A). 
 150. See Michaels, supra note 96, at 153. 
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example of the disparate treatment of under-twenty-one 
offenders. The GCA prohibited the sale of any firearm other 
than a shotgun or rifle, including concealable handguns, to 
individuals under twenty-one.151 In a 2012 challenge to the 
prohibition, the Fifth Circuit observed that Congress had 
specifically noted that concealable firearms had been “widely 
sold” to “emotionally immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and 
minors prone to criminal behavior.”152 During one 
congressional hearing, a law enforcement officer reported, 
“The greatest growth of crime today is in the area of young 
people, juveniles, and young adults. The easy availability of 
weapons makes their tendency toward wild, and sometimes 
irrational behavior that much more violent, that much more 
deadly.”153 In upholding the sale restrictions as 
constitutional, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “Congress 
was focused on a particular problem: young persons under 
twenty-one, who are immature and prone to violence, easily 
accessing handguns, which facilitate violent crime[.]”154 The 
Supreme Court declined to review the case and the ruling 
remains in place.155 
Disparate treatment of those under twenty-one is 
evident in a number of other areas of the law. For example, 
the 2008 Foster Care Act also recognizes the immaturity of 
those under twenty-one. The Foster Care Act allows the 
federal government to offer financial incentives for states 
who extend the age of eligibility for foster care services to 
twenty-one.156 In fact, the act permits states to define “child” 
 
 151. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1). 
 152. Michaels, supra note 96, at 151. 
 153. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 207 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Federal Firearms Act: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 57 (1967) (testimony of Sheldon S. Cohen)). 
 154. Id. at 208. 
 155. Michaels, supra note 96, at 152. 
 156. See id. at 154. 
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as those under the age of twenty-one.157 As Andrew Michaels 
describes, “Much like the GCA and the NMDA, the Foster 
Care Act reinforces the notion that there is an adolescent-
like quality to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.”158 Another 
area of disparate treatment is in the regulation of sexually 
oriented businesses. Some jurisdictions, for example, forbid 
those under twenty-one from operating sexually oriented 
businesses.159 Others have upheld regulations preventing 
those under twenty-one from patronizing live nude 
entertainment businesses160 or limiting their ability to 
perform in them.161 
More recently, the federal government updated the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to raise the federal 
minimum tobacco products purchasing age to twenty-one.162 
Effective since December 2019, the law prohibits the sale of 
such products as cigarettes, cigars, and e-cigarettes to those 
under twenty-one.163 Prior to the federal law’s enactment, 
nineteen states had implemented their own “Tobacco 21” 
 
 157. See id. at 154–55. 
 158. Id. at 155. 
 159. See, e.g., Am. Entertainers, L.L.C. v. City of Rocky Mount, N.C., 888 F.3d 
707, 722–23 (4th Cir. 2018) (upholding city ordinance forbidding those under 
twenty-one to “own, manage and operate an adult business”). 
 160. See, e.g., 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Adams Cnty., 799 P.2d 
917, 919, 926 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]n light of the evidence concerning 
reported property destruction and criminal activity associated with nude 
entertainment establishments, we may reasonably presume that the age 
restrictions in the ordinance reflect a legitimate legislative judgment by the 
county commissioners that youths under 21 years of age should be protected from 
the potentially harmful consequences associated with such establishments.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Doe I v. Landry, 909 F.3d 99, 105, 118 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that a state statute imposing twenty-one year age minimum on certain adult 
entertainment performers was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague). 
 162. Newly Signed Legislation Raises Federal Minimum Age of Sale of Tobacco 
Products to 21, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-
products/ctp-newsroom/newly-signed-legislation-raises-federal-minimum-age-
sale-tobacco-products-21 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
 163. Id. 
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laws.164 According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
raising the tobacco buying age to twenty-one  was necessary 
because adolescents and young adults are “uniquely 
susceptible” to nicotine addiction due to the still-developing 
nature of their brains.165 
IV. APPLYING THE ATKINS APPROACH TO YOUNG OFFENDERS 
Assuming that evolving standards of decency analysis 
justifies a categorical exemption from the death penalty for 
young offenders, the question is what form the exemption 
should take. Should the Roper bright-line rule merely be 
expanded to specified post-juvenile age groups, as advocated 
by the ABA? Or is a different approach possible? Part IV of 
this Comment will illustrate why the bright-line approach is 
not ideal for young offenders. In particular, a bright-line rule 
risks arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and is 
inimical to the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
death penalty should be reserved for the most culpable 
offenders. Rather than expanding Roper, the holistic 
approach taken in Atkins is the superior alternative. The 
remainder of this Comment addresses how applying the 
Atkins approach to post-juvenile young offenders is not only 
more desirable, but also more feasible than one might 
initially presume. 
A. The Superiority of the Atkins Exemption 
As discussed supra Part II, the Roper bright-line rule is 
problematic due to its apparent arbitrariness and failure to 
ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most 
culpable offenders.166 In contrast, one of the most important 
 
 164. Tobacco 21, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.aap 
.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/Richmond-Center/Pages 
/Tobacco-21.aspx. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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features of the modern Atkins exemption is that, unlike 
Roper, it does not employ a bright-line cutoff point using IQ 
testing. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly prohibited 
states from imposing a firm IQ score threshold. In 2014, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Hall v. Florida that states cannot 
impose a rigid IQ score to determine intellectual disability.167 
The defendant in that case had taken several IQ tests, with 
scores ranging from sixty to eighty.168 The scores below 
seventy were excluded for evidentiary reasons, leaving 
seventy-one as the lowest remaining IQ score.169 Under 
Florida law at the time, a defendant would have to show an 
IQ score of seventy or below before being allowed to present 
any other evidence of intellectual disability, such as adaptive 
behavioral evidence.170 Thus, the defendant in Hall was 
prohibited from offering evidence of intellectual disability on 
the basis of his seventy-one IQ score alone.171 
The Court found the Florida approach to determining 
intellectual disability inadequate. Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the majority, stated that the Court would consult the 
medical community for appropriate diagnosis procedures.172 
According to the Court, Florida’s IQ threshold was not in line 
with the medical community in two primary ways. First, the 
medical field does not hold IQ scoring as the exclusive 
indicator of intellectual disability; it is assessed concurrently 
with adaptive behaviors and age of symptom onset.173 By 
preventing a defendant with an IQ score one point above the 
threshold from presenting other evidence of intellectual 
disability, Florida law did not reflect established medical 
practice in diagnosing intellectual disability. Secondly, the 
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medical community does not read IQ scores as a fixed 
number but as a range, taking into account the standard 
error of measurement (SEM) of each score.174 Thus, Florida’s 
use of a single, fixed IQ score, rather than interpreting the 
score in terms of the SEM range, did not reflect established 
community practice.175 
Hall underscores the fact that a finding of intellectual 
disability is not determined by a precise metric. This is 
despite the fact that intellectual disability is a diagnosable 
condition176 and despite the prevalence of standardized 
diagnostic tools, such as IQ testing. Nonetheless, clinical 
diagnosis of intellectual disability hinges on expert 
evaluation and a constellation of factors. This suggests that 
pragmatic intuitions, which exempt those with intellectual 
deficiencies due to youth requiring courts to employ bright-
line criteria, are simply unfounded. For if clinical assessment 
of the mental deficiencies of young offenders can be brought 
into parity with assessment of the intellectually disabled—
and a bright-line test has been ruled out for one group, i.e., 
the intellectually disabled—a bright-line rule need not be 
employed for either class of offenders. 
In 2017, the Court further refined its guidance on IQ 
tests in Moore v. Texas by ruling that states could not develop 
idiosyncratic criteria to upwardly adjust the SEM range to 
deny a defendant an intellectual disability diagnosis.177 In 
Moore, the defendant had scored a seventy-four on an IQ test, 
resulting in an SEM range of sixty-nine to seventy-nine.178 
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As the low-end score of sixty-nine was below seventy, the 
trial court hearing the case was required to move on to 
evaluate the defendant’s adaptive functioning.179 However, 
the trial court decided that certain factors, such as taking the 
test in a depressed state, might have caused the defendant 
to underperform.180 Disregarding the defendant’s low-end 
score, and considering also the defendant’s score of seventy-
eight on another IQ test, the trial court concluded that the 
defendant was not in the intellectually disabled range.181 The 
Supreme Court overruled this determination as contrary to 
Hall.182 The Court stated that the SEM range of sixty-nine 
to seventy-nine put the defendant in the range of intellectual 
disability, which already accounted for testing error.183 The 
lower court could not merely cite specific sources of error to 
narrow the standard-error range.184 
Another important feature of the Atkins approach is its 
emphasis on in-depth investigation of the personal attributes 
of each offender through the adaptive behavior inquiry. In 
the simplest terms, adaptive behavior refers to the 
“collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have 
been learned and are performed by people in their everyday 
lives.”185 These skill areas can be assessed quantitatively 
using standardized measurement tools that yield adaptive 
behavior scores.186 To this end, the AAIDD has developed the 
Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale (DABS) for clinical use 
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in determining levels of limitation in adaptive behavior.187 
However, adaptive behavior assessment is not simply a 
matter of administering a single instrument to an 
individual.188 Evaluators examine the person’s life 
functioning by performing interviews with those who know 
and have observed the individual in childhood or 
adulthood.189 Personal records (e.g., school and juvenile) may 
also be reviewed.190 Unlike IQ testing, it is the clinical 
evaluator who gathers and interprets information used in 
the adaptive behavior measurement, rather than gathering 
data from the offender directly.191 
The Supreme Court in Moore also set limitations on the 
states’ procedures for evaluating adaptive behavior in Atkins 
cases. In Moore, the criminal court had further decided that 
the defendant did not exhibit the requisite adaptive 
deficiencies to qualify as intellectually disabled. The 
Supreme Court overruled this finding as well, stating that 
the state’s evaluation of the defendant’s adaptive behavior 
“departed from clinical practice.”192 For example, the state 
required that the defendant prove that his adaptive deficits 
were not the product of a personality disorder.193 However, 
modern clinical practice recognizes that many individuals 
with intellectual disabilities also have comorbid disorders, 
the presence of which is not considered evidence of the 
absence of intellectual disability.194 The state also relied on 
“lay stereotypes” to assess intellectual disability, a 
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phenomenon eschewed by the medical profession.195 In sum, 
the Supreme Court concluded that though the states have 
“some flexibility” in applying Atkins, they must be 
constrained by the “medical community’s current 
standards.”196 
While the Supreme Court has rejected bright-line rules 
for intellectual disability, Moore demonstrates that the 
states do not have free rein to make their own 
determinations regarding identification of intellectually 
disabled offenders. In essence, Moore requires states to 
largely defer to the medical community’s current practices 
with respect to both IQ testing and evaluation of adaptive 
functioning.197 This ruling is relevant to the concern that an 
Atkins-like approach to young offenders, focused on a 
qualitative assessment of personal attributes, would result 
in a hollow exemption if left up to the states to implement. 
This may occur, for example, by giving the states the ability 
to define the category so narrowly that few people would fall 
into the exemption.198 Moore demonstrates that adequate 
guidance from the Court is possible. 
The mode of assessing adaptive functioning in Atkins 
cases is significant because it demonstrates a feasible 
method of systematically evaluating qualitative aspects of an 
offender’s behaviors that show proof of intellectual 
deficiencies. Tools such as the DABS show that such 
evaluation need not be left up to subjective interpretation 
but, rather, can be standardized and made interpretable on 
the basis of quantifiable metrics. With its focus on individual 
characteristics, modern adaptive behavior assessment 
conforms to the Supreme Court’s mandate that capital 
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punishment be reserved for the most culpable offenders.199 
This is a result that the Roper approach is less capable of 
achieving, because the bright-line age threshold will fail to 
exclude offenders who ought to be exempted under the very 
rationale of the rule.200 
B. Proposals for Evaluating Young Adult Offenders 
Even if the Atkins approach is methodologically superior 
to the Roper bright-line rule, the question is still whether 
such an approach could be feasibly applied to young adult 
offenders. Admittedly, tests of mental capacities of juveniles 
and young adults are not at the same level of development as 
those used in Atkins cases (i.e., IQ and adaptive behavior 
tests). However, this fact does not warrant the conclusion 
that such testing is infeasible or unrealistic. Indeed, based 
on current science, there is ample reason to believe that tests 
analogous to IQ or adaptive behavior tests could be 
developed for use in young adult offender cases. 
On this point, one key issue to note is that brain under-
development and its concomitant behavioral expressions are 
already the subject of much empirical science. As a result, a 
number of potential tools and techniques already exist that 
may serve as the foundation of courtroom evaluations of 
young adult offenders. Most noteworthy are brain imaging 
technology and brain structuring studies. Current 
neuroscience has gained a much clearer understanding of 
what some call the “transitional age brain,” which extends 
roughly from the years thirteen to twenty-five.201 During this 
period, morbidity and mortality rates increase by 200% 
compared to childhood.202 This stage of development is 
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marked by “high rates of accident, suicide, violence, and 
health problems related to risky sexual behavior.”203 
Current research suggests this phenomenon is 
attributable to mismatches in the development of the 
nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, and prefrontal cortices.204 
The nucleus accumbens influences reward- and pleasure-
seeking behavior and matures earlier than the frontal and 
prefrontal cortices, resulting in a “mismatch of drive without 
control.”205 Meanwhile, the amygdala, the seat of emotions, 
increases in volume during the transitional age period, and 
is believed to cause adolescents to respond with “hot” 
emotions rather than more controlled “cool” emotions.206 
Eventually, the amygdala becomes more linked to activities 
of the prefrontal cortex, resulting in greater emotional 
regulation.207 As Winston W. Chung et al., explain, the 
connectivity between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex 
“signals an end to the [transitional age brain] period and the 
beginning of a more neurologically regulated period known 
as adulthood.”208  
Another potential tool to gauge developmental status of 
young adults is impulsivity, which has been widely assessed 
using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale for over sixty years.209 
Perhaps less well known, but equally impressive, is clinical 
psychology’s assessment of “future orientation,” which has 
gained more prominence in recent decades. Future 
orientation refers generally to one’s ability to set future goals 
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and plans.210 The study of future orientation is 
multidimensional, with research on such issues as the 
amount of time one thinks about or imagines the future, 
one’s pessimism or optimism about the future, and one’s 
beliefs that one’s current decisions are linked to future well-
being.211 Research has suggested, for example, that focus on 
the present is associated with risk-taking and that higher 
levels of hope have been associated with less involvement in 
violence.212 Delayed gratification is also a prominent area of 
future orientation study.213 Methodologically, research on 
future orientation has frequently involved the use of surveys 
to assess subjects.214 
A final area of study worth noting is the “maturity gap,” 
an influential theory of adolescent delinquency and anti-
social behavior developed by clinical psychologist Terrie E. 
Moffitt.215 The maturity gap essentially postulates that 
adolescents engage in delinquent or antisocial behavior in an 
attempt to reconcile their growing biological maturity with 
their lack of social maturity. That is, adolescents, 
recognizing their physical likeness to adults, are nonetheless 
treated as socially immature by society, trapping such 
individuals in a “maturity gap.”216 Adolescent offenders rebel 
 
 210. Sarah Lindstrom et al., Future Orientation: A Construct with Implications 
for Adolescent Health and Wellbeing, 26 INT’L J. ADOLESCENT MED. & HEALTH 459, 
459 (2014). 
 211. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and 
Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 28, 28 (2009). 
 212. Lindstrom et al., supra note 210, at 462. 
 213. Id. at 462. 
 214. See id. at 466–68. 
 215. J.C. Barnes et al., An Empirical Examination of Adolescence-Limited 
Offending: A Direct Test of Moffitt’s Maturity Gap Thesis, 38 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 
1176, 1176–78 (2010). See generally Terrie E. Moffitt, Life-Course-Persistent and 
Adolescence-Limited Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 
PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993). 
 216. Barnes et al., supra note 215, at 1177. Examples of disparate treatment 
include being prevented from voting, drinking, or making autonomous decisions. 
Id. 
1232 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
against their place in this gap by emulating the behavior of 
other offenders and their “adult-like” activities.217 As the 
maturity gap narrows, however, delinquency drops off.218 On 
an empirical level, Moffitt’s theory has had some level of 
predictive success. One study, for example, found that the 
maturity gap hypothesis was a salient predictor of male drug 
use and delinquency.219 The study relied primarily on self-
report questionnaires followed by interviews of study 
subjects.220 
The above sampling of current research presents hope 
that a system of measurable, standardized criteria for 
assessing young offender culpability may emerge. Brain 
imaging and brain structure research, for example, was 
immensely important to the Roper decision. As it stands 
today, brain imaging is playing an increasing role in criminal 
cases, with 5% of murder defendants and 25% of death 
penalty defendants making use of neurobiological evidence 
at trial.221 As our knowledge of the brain expands and brain 
imaging technology progresses, identification of the 
hallmarks of neurocognitive limitations that would qualify 
offenders for death penalty exemption may be possible and 
may even represent the most straightforward method of 
evaluation. 
In addition, it is notable that future orientation testing 
relies on underlying methods of data gathering similar to 
adaptive behavior testing, namely, interviews and surveys. 
Future orientation surveys may include such inquiries as 
“How often do you think about or plan your future?” or “[Are 
you] able to resist temptations when [you] know that there is 
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work to be done[?]”222 Such questions seek to uncover the 
same essential type of data as adaptive behavior testing, i.e., 
the behavior, skills, and conceptual abilities of the test 
subject. It is worth pointing out that, although adaptive 
behavior can be assessed on a numerical scale, the scale has 
meaning only because of the fact that it has been normed 
according to actual responses of intellectually disabled 
people compared to people without intellectual disabilities. 
Empirical future orientation research already employs 
quantitative scale-based metrics to assess test subject data 
and their correlative meaning.223 It stands to reason that 
future orientation testing scales could be normed and 
utilized similarly to adaptive behavioral scales. 
V. ADDRESSING CRITICISM 
The notion that an Atkins-like exemption could be 
developed for young adult offenders is untested and, as such, 
is subject to criticism. One reasonable concern is that the 
proposal may suggest that Roper’s blanket exemption of 
juveniles should be replaced by a uniform assessment 
applicable to all young offenders, theoretically subjecting 
juveniles once again to the death penalty. However, this 
Comment does not advocate abandonment of the Roper 
bright-line cut-off point as applied to juveniles. There may be 
good reason to exempt juveniles as a class from the death 
penalty without regard to their measurable intellectual 
characteristics. One reason is that so many juveniles—
indeed, likely all juveniles—would inevitably be exempted by 
a neurocognitive maturity assessment that it would be a 
waste of a court’s time and resources to perform the analysis 
in the first place. Another possible reason is the unique 
repugnance with which society regards the execution of 
juvenile offenders, justifying an unqualified exemption. 
Thus, there are compelling reasons to retain the Roper 
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bright-line rule for juveniles, even if other ages were subject 
to a different test. 
Another valid concern with taking an Atkins approach to 
young adult offenders is that it may fail to exempt offenders 
of relatively young ages due to their advanced neurocognitive 
status. However, given that young adults largely develop 
along a similar maturational curve, it is likely that an 
attribute-centric approach will include most or all young 
offenders. For those extraordinary cases that may exist—
such as a twenty-year-old with abnormally advanced 
neurocognitive development—perhaps it is necessary to 
concede that such individuals should be considered to have 
the requisite culpability for death penalty eligibility under 
current US laws. Recall that under present Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the death penalty is to be reserved for the 
most culpable offenders. If a twenty-year-old meets the 
culpability criteria on the basis of sound evidence, then 
under the law as it stands today, that individual qualifies for 
the death penalty. This result may certainly be unacceptable 
to some, but I would suggest the issue ultimately derives 
from abhorrence of capital punishment itself, not with the 
consistency of the exemption framework outlined here. As 
valid as concern over the legitimacy of the death penalty is, 
it is outside the scope of this Comment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the Roper decision in 2005, a compelling argument 
for exempting individuals under twenty-one from the death 
penalty has emerged. Public opinion and sentencing 
statistics, in particular, suggest American society is on the 
cusp of adopting such an exemption. Proponents of the 
exemption have advocated for the implementation of another 
bright-line rule demarcating twenty-one as the maximum 
age for death eligibility. However, bright-line age thresholds 
are undesirable because of their arbitrariness and 
discontinuity with the Supreme Court’s mandate that the 
death penalty be reserved for the most culpable offenders. In 
2021] ROPER’S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 1235 
contrast, the attribute-driven approach in Atkins is uniquely 
suited to assessing culpability on the basis of individual 
mental features. This Comment has sought to demonstrate 
that the Atkins approach is capable of translation into the 
sphere of young adult criminal culpability. As it stands, 
many of the clinical tools and empirical frameworks used to 
study young adult and adolescent behavior mirror those used 
in the adaptive behavior assessments in Atkins’ cases. This 
fact suggests attribute-driven measures of young adult 
maturity (and hence, criminal culpability) are capable of 
development for use in the courtroom. Adopting such an 
approach obviates the difficulties raised by Roper and would 
result in a categorical exemption for young adult offenders 
that would more adequately conform to Supreme Court 
capital punishment jurisprudence. 
